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a b s t r a c t
This study presents a model for solving the sealed-bid, multiple-issue reverse auction
problem, using multiple-criterion decision-making approaches, such that the interests of
both the buyer and the supplier are satisfied. On the supplier side, the bid construction
process is formulated as a fuzzy multiple-objective programming problem, and is
solved using an exhausted enumeration algorithm which adjusts the production plan in
accordance with the buyer’s demand, based on the current master production schedule
(MPS) and the available-to-promise (ATP) inventory. The use of the information of MPS
and ATP enables the supplier tomake accurate estimates of the production costs associated
with specific delivery dates, and thus facilitates the construction of a bid which is both
profitable and likely to secure the contract. On the buyer side, the winner determination
process is treated as a multiple-attribute decision-making problem, and is solved using
the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method. The
validity of the proposed approach is demonstrated via an illustrative example.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Internet provides enterprizes in the business-to-business (B2B) sector with unparalleled opportunities for entering
new markets, lowering their transaction costs, and improving their supply chain management capabilities, and is thus
expected to be a major factor in driving corporate growth and improving profitability over the coming years [1]. Many
firms within the B2B sector have recognized the opportunities which exist for lowering their costs by participating in online
reverse auctions. The use of such auctions, also known as electronic auctions or simply reverse auctions [2], has emerged as
a common technique for sourcing goods and services in many of the Fortune 2000 companies [3]. In general, suppliers are
motivated to participate in reverse auctions for four principal reasons, namely to increase their potential to secure new
business, to improve their market penetration, to reduce the cycle time between bidding and receiving the business, and to
improve their production scheduling and inventory management, by virtue of a shorter bid-to-sale lead-time [4].
As implied by their name, reverse auctions are simply traditional auctions in reverse [5]. In traditional (i.e. forward)
auctions, a seller offers a product for sale to the highest bidder. By contrast, in a reverse auction, a buyer offers a tender or a
contract for the supply of specific goods or services. A reverse auction startswith the creation of a request for quotation (RFQ)
which describes the buyer’s specific requirements. Qualified suppliers are then invited to participate in the bidding process.
As a result, a virtual auction is established, in which suppliers bid against one another over the Internet in an attempt to
secure the business. Broadly speaking, these auctions can be classified as either sealed-bid or open-bid, depending on the
visibility granted to the suppliers of the competing bids. In auctions of the former type, the bidders have no visibility of the
price submitted by their competitors. However, in open-bid auctions, full price visibility is made available to all participants
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involved in the bidding process. (Note that an excellent review of the principles and procedures of online reverse auctions
can be found in [6], and hence the details of the auction process are omitted here).
Many buyers view reverse auctions as an effective e-procurement mechanism for bargaining with suppliers, in order
to reduce the unit price of the purchased products. As a result, most online auctions focus almost exclusively on a single
issue, namely the price of the merchandize [7]. Therefore, such auctions are widely perceived by suppliers as no more than
a divisive purchasing tool designed to drive down unit prices, with no consideration given to the production capabilities or
financial implications on the supplier side [8]. As a result, despite reports of several well known companies, such as Quaker
Oats and SmithKlineBeecham making savings in the order of millions of dollars through the use of reverse auctions [9], an
empirical study by Emiliani and Stec [8] on the aerospace industry revealed that reverse auctions have thus far failed to live
up to expectations with regard to their potential impact on global sourcing and unit price reduction. Moreover, it has been
argued that online reverse auctions, rooted as they are in power-based price bargaining, offer no real benefits for either
buyers or sellers [10].
To release the full potential of reverse auctions by taking account of the vested interests of both buyers and suppliers,
the present study proposes a reverse auction framework based uponmultiple issues rather than price alone. In other words,
the framework assumes that the bid comprises multiple attributes,1 including not only the unit price of the product, but
also other conditions such as quality grade, warranty terms, delivery and payment terms, and so forth. Price bargaining
is a distributive bargaining process, which involves the division of a fixed resource and results in a zero-sum situation.
In reverse auctions, the contract terms and conditions frequently drive buyers and suppliers apart, since they invariably
shift the cost burden from the buyer to the supplier [11]. However, the introduction of multiple-issues into the negotiation
process creates an integrative bargaining environment [12] and generates a variable-sum situation in which the negotiators
from the two sides actively cooperate with one another to solve a common problem. Under the assumption that different
issues are accorded different weights by the two negotiators, amultiple-issue setting enables trade-offs to bemade between
different issues, such that the two parties can arrive at a mutually beneficial agreement [13]. Furthermore, multiple-issue
reverse auctions remove the overly-simplistic price-onlymechanism inherent in single-issue auctions, and create a farmore
realistic representation of the complex, real-world procurement situations encountered by suppliers and buyers in today’s
B2B sector [14].
Teich et al. [14] argued that bidders in reverse auctions require some form of guidance in determining a suitable bid price.
However, the question as to how best to provide bidders with this support has received little attention in the literature.
Thus, the current study proposes a newmodel for the reverse auction problem, in which not only the winner determination
problem is considered on the buyer side, but an optimization problem is also formulated to assist suppliers in constructing a
bid which is financially beneficial to themselves, while still having a reasonable chance of winning the business. The model
therefore consists of two separate modules, namely a multiple-attribute decision-making (MADM) module for buyers to
evaluate the bids submitted by the suppliers, and a fuzzy multiple-objective decision-making (FMODM) module to assist
suppliers in constructing suitable bids. Integrating the two modules enables the implementation of a multiple-criterion
decision-making (MCDM) approach [15], in which the two modules are solved from the buyer and supplier perspectives,
respectively, in such a way as to optimize the interests of each party, whilst simultaneously achieving a solution acceptable
to both.
In addition to a newmodel for the reverse auction problem, this study adopts the concept of available-to-promise (ATP)
inventory in solving the bid construction problem of suppliers. ATP has become a popular tool throughout businesses for
responding to customer orders. The use of ATP in our model enhances the practical usefulness of the proposed approach.
2. Review of multiple-issue reverse auctions
Multiple-issue reverse auctions allow for negotiation over price and other quantitative or qualitative attributes, such
as the delivery time, the color or quality grade of the product, warranty terms, and so forth. Furthermore, they facilitate a
greatermarket efficiency, since they enable amore effective information exchange regarding the buyer’s preferences and the
supplier’s offerings [16]. However, relatively little research has been performed into multiple-issue online auctions thus far.
In 1993, Che [17] performed a pioneering study inwhich amechanismwas developed to support governmental procurement
processes, by using a utility function to score bids in terms of their price and quality issues. Branco [18] extended this
mechanism to a two-stage auction model, in which the procurer first selects one of the competing firms, and then bargains
with this firm to agree on the required quality level. In implementingmultiple-issue reverse auctions, a fundamental concern
is the elicitation of the auctioneer’s exact preferences regarding the various issues. Various researchers have argued that this
is best achieved using some form of value function [19–21]. Meanwhile, Bichler et al. [22] advocated the use of multiple-
attribute utility theory (MAUT) to carry out bid evaluation in the multiple-issue reverse auction process. A more detailed
review of multiple-issue reverse auctions and their design features can be found in the work of Teich et al. [23].
Recently, Bichler and Kalagnanam [16] presented a number ofwinner determination problems in the context ofmultiple-
issue reverse auctions. The authors considered the specific case of multiple sourcing, in which the buyer’s demand is
allocated over multiple suppliers. In this context, the objective of the winner determination problem is to find the
1 Previous research did not always make a distinction between issues and attributes [14]. In this paper we will use these two terms interchangeably.
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Fig. 1. Reverse auction process.
combination of suppliers’ offers which collectively satisfy the demand and maximize a scoring function. The authors
formulated this problem as a 0-1 knapsack problem, with constraints imposed on the number of winning bids and the
homogeneity of the purchase. Bichler andKalagnanamalso considered the problemof configurable offers, inwhich suppliers
are allowed to specify multiple values for each issue in the bid. In other words, each bid comprises a number of different
configurations, and the buyer solves the demand allocation problem by selecting the optimum combination of configurable
offers submitted by the various bidders.
The approaches discussed above generally focus on the selection of the optimum suppliers from the buyer’s perspective,
and ignore the issue of the need to support suppliers in formulating their bids. To address this limitation, Gallien and
Wein [24] proposed a linear programming formulation whichmaximized the bidder’s payoff function subject to production
capacity constraints. However, the problem of multiple issues was not explicitly considered. Teich et al. [14] developed a
prototype online trading system designated as NegotiAuction to enable the execution of multiple-sourcing reverse auctions,
and to provide pricing guidelines for the bidders (i.e. the suppliers). In their system, the bidding process comprises two
distinct stages. In the first stage, the buyer designates each bid as either ‘active’, ‘inactive’ or ‘semi-active’ by solving
a linear programming problem designed to minimize the total buyer cost. In the second stage, when a new bid enters
the NegotiAuction system, the system calculates a suggested price for the bidder, by solving another linear programming
problem, which maximizes the bidding price under the constraint that the new bid reduces the buyer’s total cost by a
predefined amount. The bidder can then choose to accept or reject the suggested price, or to change the bid in order to
obtain a new price from the system.
Although the NegotiAuction system described above provides suppliers with the opportunity to respond to the suggested
price, it does not provide an explicit mechanism for enabling them to construct their bids on the basis of their product
costs and capacity constraints. Moreover, the price suggested by the NegotiAuction system is derived solely from the buyer’s
perspective, rather than via a process of consultationwith the suppliers. By contrast, the framework developed in the present
study is based on the premise that both buyers and suppliers have their own interests at stakewhenparticipating in a reverse
auction. In other words, suppliers determine suitable bids by considering their production costs, capacity constraints, and
profit margin, while buyers simply choose the best offer from the pool of received bids, using some form of evaluation
mechanism.
3. Modeling of multiple-issue reverse auction problem
This study considers the particular case of a sealed-bid reverse auction, in which the presented bids have multiple
attributes. The auction is one-sided (i.e. one buyer andmultiple suppliers), and only one supplier canwin the bidding process,
i.e. the entire demand is allocated to a single supplier, a process referred to as sole sourcing [16]. Fig. 1 presents a schematic
illustration of the reverse auction procedure. The major steps in this process can be summarized as follows:
Step 1. The buyer issues a RFQ to qualified suppliers.
Step 2. Upon receipt of the RFQ, the suppliers use a bid constructionmodel to check their production status, and to formulate
bids which maximize the benefits to themselves while simultaneously satisfying the buyer requirements laid out in
the RFQ. The bids are then submitted to the buyer.
Step 3. The buyer evaluates the various bids using a multiple-attribute decision-making (MADM) method, and chooses the
winning bid.
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3.1. RFQ and returned bids
A typical RFQ scenario comprises eight basic steps [4]: (1) formulate the specification, (2) identify potential suppliers, (3)
qualify the various suppliers, (4) mail RFQs to the chosen suppliers, (5) wait for a response, (6) evaluate the responses, (7)
notify the selected supplier(s), and (8) negotiate the final terms and conditions. The reverse auction procedure presented in
Fig. 1 greatly reduces the time required to complete Steps 4–7. In an investigation conducted by Smeltzer and Carr [4], it was
found that as much as 50% of the bid-to-order placement cycle time could be eliminated through the use of an electronic
reverse auction.
The RFQ provides a complete definition of the buyer’s merchandize requirements, and generally includes such details
as the quantity, the delivery time, the product specification, the quality grade, the warranty terms, the payment terms,
the delivery terms, the insurance requirements, and so on. In most proposals presented in the literature for online reverse
auctions, the bidders are automatically assumed to have the ability to satisfy all of the requirements specified in the RFQ,
and the only issue addressed is that of the unit price. However, in trading reality the conditions specified in the RFQ are
generally negotiable, and hence the scope for mutual decision-making is improved. As discussed in the previous section,
single-issue (i.e. price) reverse auctions have a number of significant limitations [10]. Accordingly, the current study focuses
deliberately on the case of multiple-issue reverse auctions.
For the sake of simplicity, this study considers the bid to comprise just two issues, namely the unit price and the
delivery time. This simplification is consistent with that adopted by Cakravastia et al. [25] in developing a method for
solving the supplier selection problem when designing a supply chain network. The same two issues were also considered
in previous studies of competitive bidding [26–28], which showed that the unit price and delivery time were absolutely key
in determining the success or failure of a supplier’s bid.
Let the bid of the i-th supplier be denoted by (pi, ti), where pi is the unit price offered by the supplier and ti is the promised
delivery time. When evaluating the bid, the delivery time, ti, is converted to the difference between the supplier’s promise
date and the delivery date specified by the buyer in the RFQ. For convenience, this difference is referred to in the following
discussions as the ‘‘delay’’ and is denoted by di. The conversion process enables the bids returned from the various suppliers
to be evaluated on an equable basis. Let e be the delivery time specified in the RFQ. The delay, di, is then computed as
di =
{
0, if ti − e ≥ 0
ti − e, otherwise. (1)
Having performed this computation, the bid is reformatted as (pi, di).
3.2. Buyer’s decision-making module
In the present study, the multiple-attribute decision-making (MADM) problem faced by the buyer in evaluating the
bids submitted by the suppliers is solved, using the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS)
method proposed by Hwang and Yoon [29]. The basic premise of the TOPSIS approach is that the optimum bid is the bid
which lies at the shortest distance from the ideal solution, and the furthest distance from the negative-ideal solution.
In the TOPSIS method, the ideal solution is represented by the combination of the best values of the individual attributes
among the various submitted alternatives. For example, assume that the following bids are received: ($100, 3 days), ($120,
0 days) and ($110, 1 days). In this example, the ideal solution is ($100, 0 days), while the negative-ideal solution is ($120,
3 days). The ideal solution concept reflects the enquiry behavior of real-world buyers, who invariably use the information
provided by different vendors as bargaining chips when negotiating with the target supplier.
According to Yang and Hung [30], the basic steps in the generic TOPSIS process is summarized as follows:
Step 1. Matrix presentation
An MADM problem can be presented in a matrix format, in which the columns indicate the attributes considered in the
problem and the rows denote the competing alternatives. Eq. (2) presents a MADMwithm alternatives and n attributes, in
which each entry xij indicates the performance rating of the i-th alternative with respect to the j-th attribute.
X =

x11 x12 · · · x1n
x21 x22 · · · x2n
...
...
...
...
xm1 xm2 · · · xmn
 . (2)
Step 2. Normalization of performance ratings
This step normalizes the performance ratings applied to the different attributes, such that they can be compared on an
equal basis. Hwang and Yoon [29] classified attributes as either benefit attributes or cost attributes, where the former relate
to a larger-the-better situation while the latter relate to a smaller-the-better situation. In the problem considered in the
present study, the two attributes of the bid, i.e. pi and di, both represent cost attributes from the buyer’s perspective. Eqs. (3)
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and (4) present the formulations used in the TOPSISmethod to normalize benefit attributes and cost attributes, respectively,
i.e.
rij =
xij −min
i
{xij}
max
i
{xij} −min
i
{xij} , (3)
rij =
max
i
{xij} − xij
max
i
{xij} −min
i
{xij} . (4)
As can be seen, following the normalization process, the performance evaluation assigned to each attribute is expressed as
a value in the interval [0, 1], irrespective of the attribute type. A larger rij indicates a greater satisfaction of the j-th attribute.
Step 3. Weighting of attributes
In reality, buyers generally consider the different attributes of a bid to have a different weight as regards their relative
importance in influencing the order placement decision. To reflect this, the normalized performance ratings computed in
Step 2 are further adjusted to vij = wjrij, wherewj is the weight assigned by the buyer to the j-th attribute.
Step 4. Ideal and negative-ideal solutions
The ideal solution, A∗, and the negative-ideal solution, A−, are determined as follows:
A∗ = {(max
i
vij|j ∈ J)|i = 1, . . . ,m} = {v∗1 , . . . , v∗n}, (5)
A− = {(min
i
vij|j ∈ J)|i = 1, . . . ,m} = {v−1 , . . . , v−n }, (6)
where J is the set of all attributes.
Step 5. Distance calculation
The distances from each alternative to the ideal solution and the negative-ideal solution are given by
S∗i =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
(
vij − v∗j
)2
, i = 1, . . . ,m, (7)
and
S−i =
√√√√ n∑
j=1
(
vij − v−j
)2
, i = 1, . . . ,m (8)
respectively.
Step 6. Similarity calculation
The similarity of each alternative to the ideal solution is then derived from
R∗i =
S−i
S−i + S∗i
, i = 1, . . . ,m (9)
and is expressed as a value in the range 0 ≤ R∗i ≤ 1.
Step 7. Ranking and selection
The alternatives are then ranked in descending order, according to their similarity measure, R∗i , and the first-ranking
alternative is chosen as the winning bid.
3.3. Supplier’s decision-making module
The success (or otherwise) of the supplier’s bid is directly related to its contents. The probability of the bid winning
the contract increases as the unit price and the delay are reduced. However, lower prices will certainly reduce revenues,
while shorter lead time might increase costs. As a result, when formulating a bid, the supplier must balance the opposing
requirements of securing the contract, whilst simultaneously enhancing its own financial position. Therefore, this study
models the bidding decision as a trade-off between the supplier’s level of profitability and the likelihood of the bid
winning the business. In other words, this decision-making has a multiple-objective formulation. The notations used in
the formulation are as follows:
Objectives:
pi : the gross profit generated from the bid.
d: the delay, i.e. the difference between the supplier’s promised delivery date and the date specified in the RFQ.
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Decision variables:
yk: the quantity acquired from the k-th production method, k = 1, 2, 3, 4; where y1 is the inventory, y2 is the current
master production schedule (MPS); y3 denotes new production lots launched to satisfy the order manufactured using
the existing production capacity; and y4 denotes crash production, i.e. newproduction lotsmanufactured using overtime
capacity.
p: the unit price quoted in the bid.
Parameters:
τ : the total production cost of the bid.
ck: the unit cost associated with the k-th production method, k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
u˜ : the upper bound of the unit price, i.e. the unit price above which the supplier considers the bid to have no chance of
success. In practice, it is difficult to assign a precise value to this parameter, and hence it is defined in the current study
in the form of a fuzzy set.
δ(·): a notation indicating that the delivery time is a function of the production plan.
Q : the buyer’s quantity requirement as specified in the RFQ.
The mathematical model used by the supplier to determine the bid is formulated as
FMODM : Maximize pi (10)
Minimize d (11)
Subject to:
p ≤ u˜ (12)
pi = p− (τ/Q ) (13)
τ = c1y1 + c2y2 + c3y3 + c3y4 (14)
d = δ(y1, y2, y3, y4) (15)
y1 + y2 + y3 + y4 = Q (16)
y1, y2, y3, y3, p ≥ 0. (17)
The constraint given in Eq. (12) expresses the supplier’s subjective judgment regarding the maximum price which the
buyer can tolerate. In the current study, this subjective evaluation is modeled using a fuzzy approach. As shown in Fig. 2(a),
the fuzzy membership function of the price variable is defined as µprice(p) ∈ [0, 1]. Basically, this membership function
describes the supplier’s belief of the possibility of winning the contract with an offer price p. The values pinf and psup in
Fig. 2(a) are assigned by the decision-maker in accordance with his/her market experience.
By introducing the fuzzy constraint in Eq. (12), the supplier’s decision-making process becomes a fuzzy multiple-
objective decision-making (FMODM) problem. Such problems are commonly solved using themax–min approach suggested
by Bellman and Zadeh [31]. In implementing this approach, it is first necessary to define the extent to which the objectives
are satisfied by different solutions in terms of membership functions. Fig. 2(b) and 2(c) illustrate the membership functions
of the pi (profit) and d (delay) objectives considered in the current FMODM problem. Note that the membership function
shown in Fig. 2(b) would provide a more convenient mechanism for the decision maker to express his or her judgment
regarding the profitability of a particular bid if it were defined on the basis of the profit rate (i.e. pi/p) rather than the
absolute value of the profit itself. However, for reasons of simplicity, this study chooses to base the membership function
on the absolute profit. Fig. 2(c) expresses the decision maker’s subjective judgment regarding the likelihood of winning the
business using bids with different values of delay, d. Note that as in Fig. 2(a), the parameters used to define the membership
functions in Fig. 2(b) and (c) are assigned directly by the decision maker.
The basic principles of the fuzzy decision-making approach proposed by Bellman and Zadeh [3] can be described as
follows. Let Gi, i = 1, . . . ,m, be them fuzzy goals and let Lj, j = 1, . . . , n, be the n constraints imposed on the decision space
Z . The degree of suitability (or membership value) of any solution for a fuzzy decision problem is defined as the conjunction
of the satisfaction (also defined in terms of the membership function) it achieves of each of the fuzzy goals and constraints
within the problem, i.e.
µD(z) = µG1(z)⊗ µG2(z)⊗ · · · ⊗ µGm ⊗ µL1(z)⊗ µL2(z)⊗ · · · ⊗ µLn(z), (18)
where z ∈ Z and⊗ is a conjunction operator. The essence of the decision-making problem, is therefore to find the solution
which maximizes µD(z). In other words, if there exists a z∗ such that µD(z∗) = maxz{µD(z)}, then z∗ represents the
optimum solution of the decision problem D. When the conjunction operator in Eq. (18) is defined as a min operator, then
the solution can be obtained using a max–min approach. When applying the max–min approach to the current FMODM
problem, the optimum solution is obtained as
µFMODM(y∗) = max
y
{min{µprofit(pi), µdelay(d), µprice(p)}}, (19)
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(a) Membership function of price. (b) Membership function of profit.
(c) Membership function of delay.
Fig. 2. Membership functions.
where y = [y1, y2, y3, y4, p] and y satisfies the constraints given in Eqs. (13)–(17). The solution obtained by Eq. (19)
represents the optimum compromise between the two objectives of the supplier’s decision-making problem, namely
reducing the delaywhilst simultaneouslymaximizing the profit. In practice, it is difficult to formulate an explicit function for
the delay constraint given in Eq. (15), and thus Eq. (19) cannot be solved directly. Accordingly, as described in the following
section, the FMODM problem is solved using an exhausted enumeration algorithm.
4. Solution enumeration for FMODM problem
The primary objective of the FMODM is to maximize the supplier’s gross profit. Clearly, the profit can be increased by
setting a higher unit price or formulating a production planwith a lower cost. However, increasing the unit price reduces the
likelihood of the bid winning the contract, while reducing the cost of the production plan invariably implies that less effort
can be expended inmeeting the buyer’s delivery date, and thus reduces the chances of the bid being accepted. In otherwords,
the two objectives conflict in nature, and thus the most appropriate bid is that which achieves the optimum compromise
between them. In the current study, this FMODM problem is solved using the exhausted enumeration algorithm illustrated
schematically in Fig. 3.
In the algorithm, each feasible proposal (i.e. production plan and price) is evaluated in terms of its profit, delay and price
membership functions. Since at the point of price determination, the production plan has already been determined, the
maximization of µFMODM(y) is, in fact, equivalent to
µFMODM(p∗) = max
p
{min{µprofit(pi), µdelay(d), µprice(p)}}. (20)
The corresponding proposal is recorded, together with the associated value of µFMODM(y). All of the proposals are
evaluated and then compared in terms of their µFMODM(y) values and the proposal with the highest value of µFMODM(y)
is selected and offered to the buyer.
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Fig. 3. Flow chart of the algorithm used to solve supplier’s decision-making problem.
Table 1
Master schedule and projected on-hand inventories
Initial inventory 100 Week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Forecast 10 30 30 30 30 60 30 30
Committed orders 20 20 5 5 25 15
Projected on-hand inventory 80 50 20 −10
To enumerate all possible production plans to fulfill the customer order, the present study assumes four different
production methods, namely (1) use inventory from the previous period, i.e. y1, (2) use the available amount that will be
produced by the current production plan, i.e. y2, (3) add new production lots to the current production plan within normal
capacity constraints, i.e. y3, and (4) implement a crash production plan using overtime capacity, i.e. y4. Clearly, the first
two methods are the most economic, since it requires no changes to be made to either the existing production plan or the
existing capacity allocation plan. The third method is more expensive, since it not only involves changing the current plan,
but may also incur additional setup costs to support the higher production requirement. Finally, the fourth method is the
most expensive, since an overtime rate must be paid to satisfy the production requirements. The buyer’s demand is fulfilled
by implementing a combination of all four methods.
In finding the feasible production plans, the amount that can be delivered is determined by applying the Available-to-
Promise (ATP) inventory concept. Basically, the ATP inventory is the uncommitted portion of a company’s inventory and
planned production, which is maintained in the master schedule to support customer order promise [32]. The use of ATP
enables the company to respond immediately to a buyer’s request and facilitates satisfaction of the delivery promise [33].
ATP has become a popular tool throughout business today, and many enterprise resource planning software systems,
e.g. mySAP ERP, utilize such a function in liaising between the Sales and Production divisions.
In practice, a number of variants of the ATP concept exist, including discrete ATP, cumulative ATP without look-ahead,
and cumulative ATPwith look-ahead [34]. In the current study, the ATP calculation is performedusing the discrete procedure
with look-ahead, which basically involves summing the booked customer orders period by period, until (but not including)
the period in which an entry exists in the Master Production Schedule (MPS).
4.1. Available-to-promise inventory
Table 1 presents a typical example of a master schedule. As shown, the forecast orders are projected over an eight-week
horizon, and committed orders exist for the first six weeks of this horizon. The initial inventory prior to the schedule is 100
units. Let Ik be the projected on-hand inventory at the k-th week, Fk be the forecasted demand at the k-th week and Ok be
the committed customer order at the k-th week, respectively. The projected on-hand inventory at the k-th week can then
be calculated by
Ik = Ik−1 −max{Fk,Ok}. (21)
Table 1 indicates that projected on-hand inventory is available for the first four weeks, at which point is becomes negative.
When the projected on-hand inventory becomes negative, a planned production (i.e. an MPS) must be assigned if the
committed orders are to be satisfied. Assuming that the production lot size is 60 units, the MPS for the master schedule
presented in Table 1 has the form shown in Table 2. The ATP appears in each interval between two consecutive planned
productions. The ATP is computed by two steps. First, summing committed orders week by week until (but not including)
a week where there is an MPS entry. For instance, in the first week of Table 2, this step results in summing committed
orders of Weeks 1–3 to obtain 45. Second, the amount obtained in the first step is subtracted from the initial inventory
plus the MPS (zero for now) to obtain the amount that is available to promise, i.e. 100 − 45 = 55. This ATP amount is
uncommitted, and it can be delivered in either Weeks 1, 2, or 3. For weeks other than the first week, the initial inventory
drops out of the computation, and ATP is the look-ahead quantity subtracted from the MPS quantity, e.g. in Week 4,
C.-B. Cheng / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 56 (2008) 3261–3274 3269
Table 2
MPS and ATP
Initial inventory 100 Week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Forecast 10 30 30 30 30 60 30 30
Committed orders 20 20 5 5 25 15
Projected on-hand inventory 80 50 20 50 20 20 50 20
MPS 60 60 60
ATP 55 30 45 60
it is given by 60 − (5 + 25) = 30. If a new order is suddenly received with a demand of 80 units for delivery by
Week 5, the sales representative can make an immediate delivery promise for this week, because the cumulative ATP to
Week 5 is (55 + 30) > 80. As additional orders are booked, they are entered in the schedule and the ATP amounts are
updated accordingly. Note that in the event that the new order discussed above was for 90 units rather than 80, the sales
representative would either need to ask the buyer to extend the delivery to Week 6, or would need to negotiate with the
Production division to modify the production plan.
Changes to the MPS can be disruptive, particularly when they occur in the early portion of the schedule. Schedule
stability is important, since unforeseen changes imply additional costs, whosemagnitudes increase the closer they fall to the
current period. As a result, most companies generally prohibit changes to the earlier portions of theMPS. Master production
schedules are commonly divided into four discrete phases (referred to as time fences), namely the frozen zone, the firm
zone, the full zone and the open zone ( [35], p. 628). The first phase usually spans the first few periods of the schedule. Once
the limits of this phase have been established, changes cannot be made in this region of the schedule without first obtaining
permission from the highest level of authority in the organization. In the second phase, changes are still disruptive, and
hence the schedule is regarded as firm, with changes being made only in exceptional circumstances. In the third phase,
order changes do not critically impact the MPS, and thus changes can be introduced provided that there is a good reason for
doing so. The final phase of the MPS is regarded as open, meaning that most of the available capacity has yet to be allocated,
and thus changes can be made without interfering with the original production schedule.
4.2. Production plan enumeration
Fig. 4 presents a flow chart showing the sequence of events performed by the supplier in finding a production plan. The
basic processes illustrated in this diagram can be explained as follows:
Case 1: If the current MPS is sufficient to meet the buyer’s demand, i.e. the cumulative ATP prior to the delivery time
requested by the buyer is greater than or equal to the buyer’s demand, then no action need be taken. Since this plan is
the most economic solution possible, a search for alternative product plans is not required.
Case 2: In the event that the current MPS is insufficient to meet the buyer’s demand, the company can choose not to modify
the current MPS, but to negotiate with the buyer instead to extend the delivery time. In this case, the new delivery time can
be found simply by cumulating the ATPs period by period until the period in which the cumulative amount is greater than
or equal to the buyer’s demand is found.
Case 3: An alternative plan can be explored, by advancing the delivery time of the current plan by one period and then
determining whether or not sufficient capacity is available to render the plan a feasible option.
In evaluating the feasibility of the trial plan, sufficient capacity is deemed to exist if the existing capacity can
accommodate for the difference between the buyer’s demand and the cumulative ATPs. If sufficient capacity does exist,
additional production lots can be added to the original MPS; otherwise, the production plan generation process enters the
scenario described in Case 4 below.
Case 3 is an iterative procedure which can be repeated over and over, until the delivery time of the trial plan falls before
the original delivery time requested by the buyer.
Case 4: In the event that the available capacity is insufficient to meet the requirements of the trial production plan, the trial
can still be satisfied by using an overtime facility to compensate for the capacity deficiency. Having taken the decision to
utilize this overtime capacity, the delivery time of the newly generated plan can be iteratively advanced by one period, as
described above, to generate further trial plans.
5. Demonstration
This section of the paper presents an illustrative example to demonstrate the decision-making models developed in the
previous sections. In the example, it is assumed that three suppliers, i.e. AUTO_A, AUTO_B and AUTO_C, receive a RFQ from
a buyer requesting the supply of 150 units of automobile rain brushes for delivery in six weeks time. It is further assumed
that the contract will be awarded to a single supplier selected via a sealed-bid reverse auction process.
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Fig. 4. Flow chart showing production plan enumeration procedure.
Table 3
Cost parameters of competing suppliers
Supplier AUTO_A AUTO_B AUTO_C
Direct labor (h/unit) 0.5 0.4 0.5
Wage rate Regular hours ($ /h) 20 25 22
Overtime ($ /h) 40 50 44
Direct material ($ /unit) 6 5.6 5
Setup ($ /batch) 200 190 195
Initial inventory ($ /unit) 17 18 22
5.1. Decision-making process on supplier side
Table 3 summarizes the cost parameters of the three suppliers. Note that neither the buyer nor the competing suppliers
have any knowledge of the cost structure of the individual suppliers. The setup cost is independent of the production lot size
and is a representative per-batch value. Finally, the cost of the initial inventory was valued when they were produced. The
computation of the production cost involves direct labor, direct material, set-up cost, and the cost incurred by production
change. Table 4 shows the parameters assigned to the price, profit and delay membership functions of the three suppliers.
Note that these parameters are confidential to the supplier to which they pertain.
5.1.1. Decision-making process of Supplier AUTO_A
Table 5 presents the current MPS of Supplier AUTO_A. The cumulative ATP toWeek 6 has a value of 35+ 60+ 70 = 165,
which is greater than the buyer’s demand, i.e. 150. Thus, the current MPS is sufficient to fulfill the order, and no further
action need be taken. In this scenario, the order can be fulfilled with no delay, and hence the supplier need only decide upon
a suitable unit price.
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Table 4
Membership function parameters of competing suppliers
Supplier Price Profit Delay
pinf psup pi inf pi sup dsup
AUTO_A 21 26 3 6 5
AUTO_B 20 26 2.5 5 4
AUTO_C 20.5 26.5 2 6 4
Table 5
MPS of supplier AUTO_A
Initial inventory 20 Week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Forecast 40 40 40 40 30 35 35 35 30 15 20 30
Committed orders 45 30 15 10 5 5 15 20 15 20 10 5
Predicted on-hand inventory 65 25 75 35 5 60 25 80 50 30 10 70
MPS 90 90 90 90 90
ATP 35 60 70 25 85
Table 6
MPS of Supplier AUTO_B
Initial inventory 10 Week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Forecast 10 30 40 40 30 20 10 20 60 20 20 20
Committed orders 20 20 5 5 15 15 10 20 10 10 10 20
Predicted on-hand inventory 80 50 10 60 30 10 0 70 10 80 60 40
MPS 90 90 90 90
ATP 55 45 60 50
Since the buyer’s demand can be satisfied from the current MPS, then y1 = 20, y2 = 130 and y3 = y4 = 0. The unit
manufacturing cost of each production lot can be determined as follows:
Direct labor 0.5 h/unit× $20/h
Direct material $6/unit
Setup $200/90 units
Total $18.22
Assuming that the inventory held by Supplier AUTO_A ismanaged on a first-in-first-out basis, the total cost of the buyer’s
order is equal to the sum of the initial inventory cost, plus the production costs incurred by the products manufactured in
Weeks 1, 3 and 6, i.e. 20 units × $17/unit + 130 units × $18.22/unit = $2708.6. Therefore, the unit cost of the order is
determined to be $2708.6/150 = $18.06.
According to the membership functions parameterized in Table 4 and Fig. 2(c), it is found that µdelay(d) = 1. Thus, in
completing the bid, it is necessary only to establish the unit price whichmaximizes theminimum ofµprice(p) andµprofit(pi).
This can be achieved by executing a bi-section search with the initial interval set as [18.06, 26], i.e. the range between the
unit cost and the value of psup given in Table 4. The optimum price is found to be $22.91, withµprice(p) = µprofit(pi) = 0.62,
and hence µFMODM(y) = 0.62. Supplier AUTO_A therefore submits a bid represented by the pair (p, t) = ($22.91,Week6)
or equivalently, (p, d) = ($22.91, 0).
5.1.2. Decision-making process of Supplier AUTO_B
Table 6 presents the current MPS of AUTO_B. From inspection, the cumulative ATP toWeek 6 is 55+ 45 = 100, which is
less than the buyer’s demand (150 units). As a result, AUTO_B must consider how best to respond to the RFQ.
Alternative 1:
The first option is to cumulate the ATP over a longer time frame. For example, when the ATPs are cumulated as far as
Week 8, the cumulative total reaches 160, which exceeds the buyer’s demand. Thus, the customer demand can be satisfied
by y1 = 10, y2 = 140 and y3 = y4 = 0. If AUTO_B chooses this alternative, the delay is 2 weeks and hence µdelay(d) = 0.5.
Applying the same procedure as that described for AUTO_A above, the unit cost of the order is found to be $17.73. In this
case, the aim in solving the FMODM problem is to find the price which yields values of both µprice(p) and µprofit(pi) greater
than 0.5. Thus, any price which satisfies µprice(p) ≥ 0.5 and µprofit(pi) ≥ 0.5 can be proposed to the buyer.
Alternative 2:
If the delivery time of Alternative 1 is advanced by oneweek toWeek 7, additional production lotsmust be launched, and
therefore a check must be made on the level of capacity availability. Table 7 shows the current workload (in hours) of the
3272 C.-B. Cheng / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 56 (2008) 3261–3274
Table 7
Capacity availability and time fence of Supplier AUTO_B
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Workload (h) 80 80 70 70 65 50 40 40 20 40 0 0
Remaining capacity (h) 0 0 10 10 15 30 40 40 60 40 80 80
Cost of adding a production ($) ∞ ∞ 200 200 150 100 50 30 10 0 0 0
production resource. Suppose that a total of 80 h of capacity exist each week. The available capacity can then be computed
by subtracting the workload from this existing capacity on a week-by-week basis, as shown in the second row in Table 7.
From Table 6, the cumulative ATP to Week 7 is found to be 100 units, i.e. 50 units short of the buyer’s demand. The
production lot size is 90 units (see Table 6), which consumes a total of 0.4 h/unit×90 units = 36 h of capacity. As shown in
Table 7, the available capacity in Week 7 is 40 h, which is sufficient to accomplish the production lot required to satisfy the
customer order. The next stage of the decision-making process, is therefore to check the time fence associated with Week
7 to determine whether or not changes to the production schedule are permitted in this portion of the MPS. In order to
integrate the time fence concept into the current FMODMmodel, the various phases of the MPS are quantified using a cost
measure. For example, Table 7 shows that the cost incurred by adding a new production lot in Weeks 1 and 2 is infinity,
indicating that both periods fall within the frozen zone. Similarly, the firm zone, full zone and open zone are discriminated
by applying different cost values to the corresponding periods.
The unit manufacturing cost incurred when adding a new production lot in Week 7 is computed as follows:
Direct labor 0.4 h/unit× $25/h
Direct material $5.6/unit
Setup $190/90units
Time fence cost $ 50/90units
Total $18.27
The order requirement is satisfied by y1 = 10, y2 = 90, y3 = 50 and y4 = 0, and hence the total cost of the order is
calculated to be 10 units × $18/unit + 90 units × $17.71/unit + 50 units × $18.27/unit = $2687.4, with the result that
the unit cost of the order is $17.92. This alternative has a delay of 1 week, for which µdelay(d) = 0.75. Applying a bi-section
search, the optimum unit price is determined to be p = $21.93, which yields µprice(p) = µprofit(pi) = 0.68 and hence
µFMODM(y) = 0.68.
Alternative 3:
An alternative trial plan can be explored, by advancing the delivery time considered above by a further week. However,
Table 7 shows that only 30 h of capacity are available in Week 6, which is insufficient to complete the production lot (36 h).
As a result, 6 h of overtime capacity are required to satisfy the customer order. The corresponding unit manufacturing cost
of the production lot is therefore given by
Direct labor:
Regular hours (30 h× $25/h)/90 units
Overtime (6 h× $50/h)/90 units
$11.66/unit
Direct material $5.6/unit
Setup $190/90 units
Time fence cost $100/90 units
Total $20.48
The total order requirement is satisfied by y1 = 10, y2 = 90, y3 = 0 and y4 = 50, and thus the total cost is
10 units × $18/unit + 90 units × $17.71/unit + 50 units × $20.48/unit = $2797.9. In other words, the unit cost of
the order is $18.65. This production plan has no delay and hence µdelay(d) = 1. The optimum unit price is found to be
p = $22.57, yielding µprice(p) = µprofit(pi) = 0.57, and thus µFMODM(y) = 0.57.
Since this plan satisfies the delivery time requested by the buyer, there is no sense in advancing the delivery time by
a further week. In other words, all of the feasible production plans have been identified. Ranking the three alternatives in
terms of their µFMODM(y) values, it is found that Alternative 2 (0.68) > Alternative 3 (0.57) > Alternative 1 (0.5). As a
result, AUTO_B proposes Alternative 2, i.e. a bid of (p, d) = ($21.93, 1 week), to the buyer.
5.1.3. Decision-making process of supplier AUTO_C
The basic principles of the supplier’s decision-making process have been described in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. Hence, for
Supplier AUTO_C, it is simply assumed here that the supplier submits a bid of (p, d) = ($21.36, 2 weeks).
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5.2. Decision-making process on buyer side
The bids submitted from the three suppliers can be represented in the following matrix form:
Price Delay
AUTO_A 22.91 0
AUTO_B 21.93 1
AUTO_C 21.36 2
Normalizing this matrix using Eq. (4) yields
Price Delay
AUTO_A 0.00 1.0
AUTO_B 0.63 0.5
AUTO_C 1.00 0.0
Assuming that the price and delay attributes have an equal weighting, then it follows that the ideal and negative-ideal
solutions are given respectively by
A∗ = [1.00, 1.0], and
A− = [0.00, 0.0].
The distances of each bid from these two solutions are as follows:
S∗(AUTO_A) = 1.00, S−(AUTO_A) = 1.00,
S∗(AUTO_B) = 0.62, S−(AUTO_B) = 0.80,
S∗(AUTO_C) = 1.00, S−(AUTO_C) = 1.00.
The similarity measures of the three bids are thus obtained as
R∗(AUTO_A) = 0.50, R∗(AUTO_B) = 0.56, R∗(AUTO_C) = 0.50.
Therefore, the bids can be ranked as AUTO_B > AUTO_A = AUTO_C. Consequently, the buyer accepts the bid submitted
by supplier AUTO_B.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a model for sealed-bid multiple-issue reverse auctions. In this auction setting, a buyer sends a
RFQ to multiple suppliers, who respond by submitting bids comprising two attributes, namely the price and the promised
delivery date. The bids are visible only to the buyer and thewinner is determined in a single round. In the proposedmodel, the
decision-making problems at the supplier and buyer sides are solved using FMODM andMADM, respectively. In solving the
supplier’s decision-making problem, the objective is to identify the bid which achieves the optimum compromise between
the conflicting requirements of reducing the delivery delay on one hand, andmaximizing the supplier’s profit margin on the
other. In this study, this problem is solved using an exhausted algorithm based on the supplier’s master production schedule
(MPS), and available-to-promise (ATP) inventory. On the buyer side, the objective of the decision-making process is simply
to determine the winning bid, i.e. to solve the winner determination problem. In the framework proposed in this study, this
is achieved using the TOPSIS method.
Previous proposals for solving the reverse auction problemhave focused principally on thewinner determination process
performed on the buyer side. However, Teich et al. [14] argued that when implementing a reverse auction, support should
be provided not only to the bid-taker, but also to the bidders. Accordingly, the authors developed a trading system which
provided suppliers with a suggested price. However, the price proposal mechanismwas one-sided in the sense that the sole
objective in setting the price was simply to lower the buyer’s cost. By contrast, the basic premise of the model presented in
the current study is that buyers and suppliers have conflicting vested interests in the reverse auction. Accordingly, this study
has developed decision-makingmodelswhich reflect the individual concerns of the two sides, i.e. the price and delivery date
on the buyer side, and the profit margin and likelihood of the bid’s success on the supplier side. In addition, the use of the
ATP concept in the model also enhances the practical usefulness of our approach.
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